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MANDATORY DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER AND
THE TAKING CLAUSE: THE CASE OF
MANHATTAN'S TUDOR CITY PARKS
NORMAN MARCUS*
This article is dedicated to my late father-in-law, Arthur Lenhoff,
who taught at the University of Buffalo Law School from 1939 to
1957 when he retired as Distinguished Professor of Law. His memory
continues to ignite the legal imagination.
INTRODUCTION
n the last decade, nationwide concern over environmental protec-
tion has greatly increased. The courts have responded by taking
a broader view of regional, state and municipal police power to pro-
tect threatened natural resources.' Actions which would have been
seen as unconstitutional "takings" several years ago have recently
been held valid exercises of the police power. 2 Unfortunately, courts
have stopped short of applying these same rules to protect urban areas
of critical concern to the general public. An open space in midtown
Manhattan is an important-perhaps even more important to a larger
number of people-as an unspoiled beach on the California coast. Yet
the New York State Supreme Court has recently struck down New
York City's plan to preserve two private urban parks by allowing the
potential developer to transfer his building rights to other sites.3
This article will take the position that this plan, and similar
land use controls which allow a potential for profitable use, do not
constitute takings, but are legitimate and justifiable exercises of the
* Counsel, New York City Planning Commission. B.A., Columbia College, 1953;
L.L.B., Yale Law School, 1957.
The author is indebted to Bernard J. Kabak, a former attorney in the Counsel's
office, for many of the ideas herein expressed, and to Janine Petit for her helpful re-
search in connection with the preparation of this article.
1. See, e.g., Candlestik Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Ist Dist. 1970).
2. For a discussion of the "taking" clause of the fifth amendment, see notes 72-
121 infra & accompanying text.
3. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d







state's power to promote the general welfare 4 Medieval concepts of
property need no longer frame municipal alternatives in densely
built urban areas. Such areas arguably need greater control over land
use than rural districts, as was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.5
New York City is attempting to preserve its irreplaceable urban
resources through land use controls, including the transfer of develop-
ment rights. If this effort is to be successful, certain fundamental
principles concerning property, and the rights accruing to it, must be
clarified in light of the changing needs of modern times. A review
of the growing importance of the three-dimensionality of property
interests,0 coupled with an historical analysis of the taking issue in
English common law, the United States Constitution and subsequent
state constitutions,7 provides the appropriate framework within which
to evaluate land use controls similar to those enacted to preserve
private open spaces in densely developed areas.
The case of the Tudor City Parks provides an object lesson on
how the quality of the urban environment is in danger of being
downgraded. Such downgrading should not be tolerated since it is
supported only by an essentially medieval view of property geared
to an agricultural society and by a retiring view of governmental
police power based upon the social Darwinism fashionable in the
early 20th century.8
I. THE TUDOR CITY PARKS
The Tudor City complex is a unique part of mid-Manhattan.
The two small, private parks surrounded by tall apartment buildings
form a key spot of greenery, light and air in one of the most densely
built, and worst polluted, parts of Manhattan. At the time of its con-
struction, between 1925 and 1931, Tudor City was one of the first
large-scale urban renewal developments in New York City. The site,
4. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(24), (25) (McKinney 1968).
5. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6. See notes 30-71 infra & accompanying text.
7. F. BOSSELmAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973) (written
for the Council on Environmental Quality) [hereinafter cited as TAKING ISSUE].
8. See S. TOLL, ZONED AmERICAN (1969).
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located in the old slaughterhouse district, is today one of the "best"
neighborhoods in the city.
The development was built on a level above 42d Street, across
First Avenue from the present site of the United Nations. Elevating
the project prevented much of the traffic congestion which a develop-
ment of this size could have caused. The design is such that deliveries
and tenant traffic are removed from the main thoroughfares of 42d
Street, First and Second Avenues to Tudor City Place. Furthermore,
as Fred F. French, builder and manager of Tudor City, mentioned
when announcing his development plans: "The surest way to solve
the traffic problem is eliminate it. That is, establish living quarters
near one's place of business."9
The 12-building complex includes hotels, several restaurants,
many small shops, and apartment buildings in the Tudor style, con-
taining over 3,300 apartments. The buildings are grouped around
two 15,000 square-foot parks located on either end of a bridge span-
ning 42d Street. Most windows in the project face the parks, toward
which the large majority of apartments are oriented. The New York
Times noted with interest the park development, stating: "So far as
known it will be the first park developed in Manhattan by private
interests for nearly a hundred years."'1
In 1972, the entire Tudor City complex, including the parks,
was sold to a New York real estate developer who owns much of the
property in midtown Manhattan, including the Empire State Build-
ing. When the developer announced plans to build in the park space
or, alternatively, over 42d Street, there was an immediate public
outcry. The City Planning Commission proceeded to examine five
possible plans for the parks." The first was to allow the developer
to erect, as-of-right, a 32-story residential tower on the site of the
northern park and a 28-story tower on the southern park. The pri-
vate parks, four brownstones on East 43d Street, and the Hermitage
-a 10-story, 50-unit apartment house-would have been demolished
under this plan. The design concept and architectural unity of Tudor
City would have been lost. The new towers would have cast shadows
for most of the day over two, small public parks on the lower 42d
9. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1925, at 1, col. 4.
10. Id. July 24, 1927, § 10, at 2, col. 4. Samuel B. Ruggles created Gramercy
Park in 1831.
11. City Planning News, Sept. 19, 1972.
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
Street level and would have interfered with the light and air of the
tenants of the remaining Tudor City buildings and nearby structures.
Added to the neighborhood would be 530 luxury-class apartments, a
net gain of 466 high-priced housing units and a net loss of 32,543
square feet of park space.
The second possibility, a single tower spanning 42d Street, was
thought by many to be the plan preferred by the developer. "It's
more prestigious," said 'Jacquelin T. Robertson, then Director of the
Mayor's Office of Midtown Planning and Development. "He [the de-
veloper] is not a guy out scrambling. He's at the top of the ladder."' 2
This building would have retained the parks and opened them to the
public. The city could have exercised some design control over the
new structure which, compared to the "as-of-right" buildings, would
have interfered less with the light and air of the surrounding Tudor
City apartments. But it also would have overshadowed the park area
for much of the day. New mapping and zoning legislation would have
been required, since this would have been the first time a private
structure had been erected over a major city street. The developer
also sought compensation for the cost of building a platform 30 feet
over 42d Street claiming the platform as part of his lot area for bulk
computation ,purposes. The prospect of setting a precedent for tun-
nelling other major city streets was disturbing, both in terms of den-
sity and urban design. Questions of tunnel safety, ventilation and
traffic control also arose. Finally, the monumental, 50-story tower
would have placed several 42d Street frontages in shadow, blocked
the 42d Street vista, and screened the United Nations Building. From
the viewpoint of urban design, it was not a desirable alternative.' 3
The next two plans explored the possibility of first, building on
the north park while relocating it on a bridge over 42d Street (this
would have involved demolishing the same buildings as in the "as-of-
right" plan); and, second, building on the "as-of-right" design but, this
time, replacing the parks with a new park above 42d Street.
The final, and most popular, alternative was the creation of a
special zoning district for private parks in the densely developed mid-
12. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1972, at 38, col. 2.
13. NEw YoRx Crry PLANNING COMMISSION REPORT (No. CP-22128A Nov. 8,
1972) [hereinafter cited as COmIssIoN REPORT].
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town-Manhattan area.' 4 Only recreational facilities would be permit-
ted in areas so designated, but the owner would be able to sell or
transfer the allowable building rights from his private park space to
eligible receiving parcels in the midtown core.1 This transfer, how-
ever, would represent a deviation from traditional zoning ordinances
based on the zoning lot.
Zoning controls define the development potential of a lot. New
York City's Zoning Resolution allows a certain height, bulk and den-
sity for structures on each lot, proportionate to the size of the lot and
appropriate to its location. When landmarks or private parks do not
utilize the permitted bulk of a lot in a high-density area, owners are
encouraged to destroy the present use and rebuild to the allowable
maximum. In order to preserve a threatened critical resource, how-
ever, it is necessary to divert the development pressure elsewhere.
Traditional zoning ordinances regard transfer of unused development
rights to noncontiguous lots in separate ownership as contrary to
a sense of uniform controls in a given area. They view the relation-
ship of density controls to street width, transit access, school seats and
other infra-structure requirements as failing to survive indiscriminate
transferability of unused development rights between widely spaced
parcels. The unit of development control chosen in these ordinances
is the zoning lot. Had a different unit of control been chosen as its
basis, for example, a block or a square mile, there would have been
no bias against wider area transferability of development potential.
A block-by-block control could achieve density objectives as success-
fully as a lot-by-lot approach.' 6 The city's fifth and final alternative
recognized both the need to preserve a threatened resource and the
density objectives by allowing transfer of development rights within
a wider unit of development control.
The plan for development rights transfer was accepted by the
City Planning Commission as the best alternative.1 Designated areas
in private ownership now used for recreational purposes within the
boundaries of the granting district would be mapped with a special
14. The boundaries of the Special Park granting district are: 60th Street, East
River, 33d Street, Hudson River.
15. The boundaries of the receiving district are: 60th Street, Third Avenue, 38th
Street and Eighth Avenue.
16. See Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEIMP.
PROB . 372 (1971).
17. See CoMIssION RnPoRT (No. CP-22128A Nov. 8, 1972).
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"P" overlay. Eligibility to receive development rights within the re-
ceiving district would be dependent on a minimum lot size of 30,000
square feet and zoning presently permitting development at the maxi-
mum allowable commercial density-15 FAR. 8 The owner of a
designated granting lot would be able to transfer part of his develop-
ment rights to any eligible receiving lot, increasing that lot's maxi-
mum floor area up to 10 percent. Additional bulk modification au-
thorizing the increase in the floor area ratio of the receiving lot by
more than 10 percent, but not exceeding 20 percent of the maximum
limit, would be possible under a special permit procedure but would
require a public hearing before the Planning Commission and the
City's Board of Estimate. 19 The transfer would be subject only to
certification by the Chairman of the City Planning Commission of
the appropriateness of a program for the continued maintenance of
the open recreational area and its conversion to public use; the park
would remain private until the certification of the first development
rights transfer therefrom.
Supporting the creation of the new Special Park District the
Commission said:
It is the Commission's judgment that the redistribution of bulk
which may occur as a result of designating existing parks under this
procedure is warranted by the nature and extent of the infrastruc-
ture network which exists in this area. There will be no net increase
in the density as a result of this procedure in the total midtown area
comprising the outer boundaries of the granting lot district . . .
merely a redistribution of bulk to protect current amenities in the
area'.
2 0
In the case of Tudor City, the value of the development rights has, if
anything, increased by moving from a residential district,21 charac-
terized by land values of not more than $150 per square foot, to a
18. FAR (Floor Area Ratio) is a concept which is used to control the amount
of building on a lot. The FAR "number" represents the multiple of the lot area which
produces the allowable maximum floor area in the development.
19. The requirement of a public hearing would seem responsive to the question of
lack of notice to neighboring lots in the receiving district. See Fred F. French Inv. Co.
v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 203-04, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762, 767 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
20. See CoamsssioN REPORT (No. CP-22128A, Nov. 8, 1972).
21. Tudor City is zoned predominantly R-10-a classification which permits a de-
velopment containing floor area ratio of ten times the lot area (FAR 10) and ap-
proximately 400 dwelling units per acre.
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commercial district where land values typically run to $300 per square
foot.22
The Special Park District was approved by the City's Board of
Estimate and became a part of the Zoning Resolution.2 The decision
was greeted enthusiastically by city residents, the architectural com-
munity, and the press. In an editorial dated December 18, 1972, The
New York Times wrote:
Those Tudor City Parks
Small, pocket-sized parks are an endangered species in urban en-
vironments, usually coveted by developers and especially susceptible
to obliteration by construction of new towers of concrete and
steel ....
... [A] recent decision by the Board of Estimate deserves warm
commendation. In the uneven struggle between small parks and
large developers, the Board opted for a compromise settlement that
seems to us to be eminently fair ....
Such transferability of air rights, which are extremely valuable
in this city, represents a new concept now written into municipal law.
It is an idea fervently espoused by the "Save Our Parks" committee
which waged a mighty struggle in behalf of the Tudor City sanc-
tuaries of green, beautifully landscaped in the English manner with
pebbled walks, shrubs and trees. These delightful parks will remain
as refuges from the hurly-burly and congestion of East 42nd Street.24
The conflict over the Tudor City Parks did not end, however,
with the creation of the Special Park District. The previous owner,
who had retained a first mortgage on the property when it was sold
to the developer and his three development companies, brought suit
22. B. Kabak, Value of Tudor City Development Rights, Nov. 24, 1972 (appen-
dix to memorandum to Norman Marcus, prepared with the assistance of Alfred Schim-
mel, Director of Mortgage Research Analysis) (on file at New York City Planning
Commission). See also Letter from John A. Munro, Vice President, Ely-Cruikshank Co.,
Inc., real estate appraisers to John F. McKean, Nov. 21, 1972 (on file at New York
City Planning Commission). The Tudor City Parks development rights have, to the
author's knowledge, been the subject of at least one substantial offer to purchase.
23. NE w Yoax Crrv, N.Y., ZONING REs. § 91-00 et seq. (1973).
24. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1972, at 38, col. 2. A comparable expression appeared
in the N.Y. Daily News, Nov. 10, 1972:
WORTHY OF KING SOLOMON-is the decision by the City Planning
Commission vetoing realtor Harry Helmsley's scheme to replace two patches
of Tudor City greenery with high-rise masonry. Instead the Commission is
offering Helmsley bonus additions to other planned developments in central
Manhattan. It is we think, an eminently fair ruling all around.
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against the city, the state and the four mortgagees 25 after the devel-
opers defaulted on their mortgages.26 The plaintiff claimed that the
city's action amounted to inverse condemnation-an unconstitu-
tional "taking" of property for which the transferable air rights were
not just compensation. The city answered by contending that its ac-
tion fell within the permissible ambit of the zoning police power.27
Justice Waltemade of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
ruled for the plaintiff, but stopped short of embracing the plaintiff's
inverse condemnation theory.28 The court found that the uncertain
value of the development rights barred them from consideration as
compensation and held that property owners in the receiving area
had not been given sufficient notice of the density that would be added
to their district. The court's order invalidated the zoning amendment
establishing the Special Park District and restored the zoning classi-
fication previously in effect.29 The city is in the process of appealing
this decision.
II. EvoLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY INTO
THREE DIMENSIONS
What do these terms "property" and "taking" mean? Does prop-
erty signify today what it did 200 years ago when the fifth amend-
25. Ramsgate Properties, North Assemblage Company, South Assemblage Com-
pany, and Harry B. Helmsley.
26. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d
762 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
27. The Planning Commission examined both adverse possession and prescriptive
easement as alternatives to the planned development. Both alternatives were rejected.
See M. Levine, Tudor City-Adverse Possession and/or Prescriptive Easements, March
24, 1972. (memorandum to Norman Marcus) (on file at New York City Planning
Commission). The tenants of the development could not claim prescriptive easement
rights, since their possession is not deemed adverse to that of the landlord. Olin v.
Kingsbury, 181 App. Div. 348, 168 N.Y.S. 766 (1st Dep't 1918); REAL PROP. ACTIONS
LAW § 531 (McKinney 1963). The unorganized public cannot acquire rights by pre-
scription since there is no grantee capable of taking under the presumed grant. Morgan
v. McLoughlin, 6 Misc. 2d 434, 163 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
28. "In those cases where the Courts have invoked the doctrine of inverse con-
demnation, the owners' property had been physically taken and used by the appropriat-
ing authorities so that a restoration of the property to the owners was not possible."
Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d at 205, 352 N.Y.S.2d at
768; see Hyert v. Orange & Rockland Util., Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 352, 218 N.E.2d 263, 271
N.Y.S.2d 201 (1966); Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 N.E.2d 801
(1936); Buholtz v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 40 App. Div. 2d 283, 339 N.Y.S.2d 775 (4th
Dep't 1973).
29. 77 Misc. 2d at 205, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
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ment was written, or 400 years ago when agriculture was the domi-
nant use of land? Even in those days, the police power of the state
could regulate property in the public interest. Where is the line to
be drawn between the legitimate use of this power and an unconstitu-
tional taking? It is necessary to examine the history of these concepts
to uncover the social forces and policies from which they were de-
rived. We can then determine their present-day relevance and attempt
to apply them in a manner which affords the maximum social utility
for our own time.
A. The Early Importance of the Earth's Surface
The idea that dominion over real property means control over a
portion of the earth's surface, uniquely and permanently positioned
in space, goes back to early common law. That does not mean, of
course, that the idea retains its vigor today. "It is revolting to have
no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past." 30 The principle that loca-
tion in space is the essence of real property was based on grounds
that have, indeed, long since vanished.
The first of these grounds, the idea of seisin, was so fundamental
that "we may almost say that the whole system of our [English] land
law was law about seisin and its consequences." 81 Seisin generated title
to land; there was no title without its root in seisin. Seisin meant
possession, the physical occupation of the land. For title to be con-
veyed there had to be a "livery of seisin," a transference of the physi-
cal possession of the land from the grantor to the grantee.8 2 Livery
of seisin was accomplished by the donor and the donee coming upon
the land and pronouncing the words of donation. If the parties were
daring, it was sufficient for them to perform the livery of seisin with
the land merely in view; but even then it was essential for the donee
to have made an actual entry on the land while the donor was yet
30. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rav. 457, 469 (1897).
31. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 29 (2d ed.
1898) (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 29, 83.
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alive.33 There was no nonsense about charters of feoffment or other
documents, which the Romans had used to convey land until the
barbarians invaded. Even when charters were first introduced, their
reading would be followed by a ceremony on the land itself includ-
ing, at times, a perambulation of its boundaries before witnesses.3 4
Not even a royal charter could confer title without livery of seisin.
"If the king made two inconsistent gifts, a later charter with an
earlier seisin would override an earlier charter with a later seisin."35
In a system where title was held through seisin and conveyed
through livery of seisin, it is no small wonder that such great em-
phasis was placed on physical control over the land. In law, nothing
else mattered. We have, of course, long since abandoned the idea of
seisin and its ceremonies as controlling in the law.36 The idea of
physical control over a portion of the earth's surface as being the
essence of real property, to the extent that it is derived from seisin,
should likewise be abandoned.
The second ground for the principle that location in space and
dominion over a defined surface of land is the essence of real prop-
erty relates, not to England's legal system, but to its economic system.
The common law emerged in England before the Industrial Revolu-
tion. Throughout that period, "the structure of the nation had been
essentially medieval; so too, had been its law. If we are to seek the
fundamental notes of this medieval policy we shall find that they
were based upon the fundamental fact that the normal occupation
of the bulk of the inhabitants was agriculture."3 7 Citing Lord Coke,
Blackstone said that land "comprehendeth in its legal signification
any ground, soil, or earth whatsoever; as arable, meadows, pastures,
woods, moors, waters, marshes, furzes, and heath." 38 Land, in other
words, was valued for the qualities of its surface, the qualities that
33. Id. at 83.
34. Id. at 86-90.
35. Id. at 90 (footnote omitted).
36. A trace of seisin still remains. In some states, officers of adjoining towns are
required by statute to go over the common boundary line together, the proceeding be-
ing known as perambulation. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2001 (1964);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2 (1970).
37. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMION LAw 64 (2d ed. 1936).
38. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *17.
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count in an agricultural economy.30 This point has not been lost on
the courts:
In the earlier days of the common law the attention of buyers and
sellers and therefore the attention of the courts, was fixed upon the
surface. He who owned the surface owned all that grew upon it and
all that was buried beneath it. His title extended upward to the
clouds and downward to the earth's center. The value of his estate
lay, however, in the arable qualities of the surface, and, with rare
exceptions, the income derived from it was the result of agriculture.40
It is clear that the concept of property in the common law, where
the land's location and surface are emphasized, does not contradict
the position taken herein-that the essence of property is its po-
tential for profitable use.41 The point of tangency between the old
common law of real property and the modern law of real property
is not that land's surface and location in space are the essence of real
property, but that profits are. "Medieval land law is not to be under-
stood apart from medieval agriculture, ' 42 and modern land law is
not to be limited by the requirements of medieval agriculture.
Finally, there were social and political reasons why dominion
over a defined surface was an important early principle. These rea-
sons, too, are no longer applicable. In England, prior to the Indus-
trial Revolution, land was the basis of stability in society. "Land was
the principal form of wealth, and therefore, the principal source of
power, and the law had to take account of this situation."4 3 The
exigencies of modem society are quite different. Stability is no longer
achievable through the fixity offered by land. What is needed today
is a dynamic stability, founded on the ability to adjust to ever-chang-
ing needs and demands, and a method "to accommodate conflict and
39. The legal importance attached to land in an agricultural economy is by no
means unique to the common law system. In Roman Law, the Res Mancipi, the su-
perior form of property, was land, slaves, and beasts of burden. F. MAITLAND, ANCIENT
LAW 265, 269 (1963). "It is impossible to doubt that the objects which make up the
class are the instruments of agricultural labour, the commodities of first consequence to
a primitive people." Id. at 269.
40. Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 86, 295, 25 A. 597, 598 (1893).
41. The King v. Inhabitants of All Saints, 105 Eng. Rep. 984 (K.B. 1816). For
collected cases on this point, see Horizontal Divisions of Land, 10 (n.s. 1) AM. L.
REGISTER 577, 581-84 (U. of Pa. 1862).
42. F. MAITLAND, Tenures in Rousillon and Namur, in 2 COLLECTED PAPflRS 252
(H. Fisher ed. 1862).
43. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 37, at 64.
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allocate the costs of that accommodation."4 4 Dynamic stability can
be achieved by "trying to determine what resolution of conflicting
uses is likely to maximize total net benefits for us, and how we can
best achieve that goal." 45
Maximizing net benefits is, of course, the objective of most gov-
ernment action today. It is the specific objective of the Park District
regulation. Ultimately, the Park District regulation is a legislative
body's innovative application of its power to regulate the develop-
ment of land for the public good, without sloughing off the constitu-
tional obligation to protect private values by leaving the problem in
the hands of the judiciary. The fundamental soundness of this ap-
proach is advocated by Professor Michelman: "[W]hat is counselled
here is, more than anything else, deemphasis of reliance on judicial
action as a method of dealing with the problem of compensation." 46
In summary, the principle that location in space is the essence
of real property was based on three grounds-a legal doctrine
(seisin), an economic base (agriculture), and a political system (land
as a source of power and social stability)-that have become infirm
through time. A landowner's expectation of spatial dominion over
his property, since it is based on grounds now infirm, has dimin-
ished purpose in our law today. The courts should refrain, therefore,
from elevating this expectation to the point of being a constitution-
ally protected interest in real property.
B. The Growing Importance of Development Rights
For over 100 years, scholars, recognizing the infirmity of medieval
property concepts, have contended that development rights have real
value distinguishable from the land to which they attach. 7 In Hori-
44. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 186
(1971).
45. Id.
46. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, 80 IARv. L. Rxv. 1165, 1167
(1967). See also Krasnowiecki & Strong, Compensable Regulations'for Open Space, 29
J. Am. INST. OF PLANNERS 87 (1963).
47. For a discussion of development rights in the non-urban context, see Car-
michael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Controls, 2 FLORIDA
ST. U.L. REv. 35 (1974), which explores the relationship of development rights to oil
and gas regulation, drainage, irrigation control, and the Mill Dam Acts.
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zontal Divisions of Land,48 the author raises the question of whether
the space or column of air above a man's soil is an interest that can
be severed from the soil and granted or conveyed as a freehold tene-
ment. He notes the English and Scottish authorities favoring the
proposition and observes that "we know of reason why they [the
cited authorities] are not applicable in this country. It is true, land
is more valuable, houses are more lofty, and cities cover smaller areas,
in proportion to their respective populations, where these peculiar
ownerships occur, than they do in this country; but as our popula-
tion increases we may adopt the same habit. '4
In their decisions, the courts have avoided ruling directly on the
question of whether development rights can form a type of real prop-
erty separate from the land or a structure on the land. 0 One of the
earliest cases appearing to support this doctrine was Pearson v. Mathe-
son,51 decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court in 1915. It was
held that a reservation in the grantor of all rights in the space
more than. fourteen feet above the ground was valid. A slightly later
case, Taft v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 2 cited Pearson as an
example of the "well-recognized common law right"53 to subdivide
horizontally.
As Horizontal Divisions of Land54 predicted, it is especially in
dense urban areas, like New York City, that the space above the soil's
surface has become most valuable. Land owners and developers have
been eager to exploit the inherent value of clustering development
rights. For example, in Glen Oaks, Queens, New York, the owner of
106 acres used for a golf course had the option of building more than
2,500 single family houses on his property. The houses, together with
the paved streets, would have covered most of the site, destroying the
golf course and creating serious storm water run-off and sewer prob-
lems. The owner chose, instead, to create a large-scale residential
48. Horizontal Divisions of Land, 1 (n.s. 1) Am. L. REoISTER 577 (U. of Pa.
1862).
49. Id. at 580.
50. New York courts realized as early as 1863 that the value of an interest in
property was not necessarily tied to the land. In Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 498
(1863), the court ruled that a tenant in an upper story was no longer liable for rent
when the building burned down.
51. 102 S.C. 377, 86 S.E. 1063 (1915).
52. 127 Wash. 503, 508, 221 P. 604, 606 (1923).
53. Id.
54. See Horizontal Divisions of Land, supra note 48.
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
developmentm5 by transferring all the development rights to a portion
of the large-scale single zoning lot constituting only two percent of
the site, thus preserving the golf course.56 Further examples of devel-
opment rights transfers as a technique to preserve landmarks are ex-
plored infra.
The attitude of the courts is exemplified by Newport Associates,
Inc. v. Solow, 57 where development rights were seen as "valuable and
transferable."' 8 In Newport, plaintiff was the owner of land in Man-
hattan, improved by a building that had less bulk than the Zoning
Resolution allowed, leaving a surplus of development rights. De-
fendant was the lessee of the plaintiff's land and building and owner
of two adjoining parcels. Under a provision of the Zoning Resolution
that allowed the transfer of development rights between adjoining
parcels,59 defendant sought to transfer the surplus development rights
from plaintiff's parcel to his own, where he was constructing an office
building. Plaintiff sued to prevent the transfer of the development
rights, contending that the transfer would diminish the value of his
property. The court held for the defendant. Although no constitu-
tional issue was raised in the case, Newport is significant because it
shows that the court of appeals was comfortable with the notion that
development rights, as separate from the land that generates them,
have a value of their own and can be transferred easily.60 These prin-
ciples were not questioned even by the appellate division, whose hold-
ing for the plaintiff6' was reversed by the court of appeals. Indeed, the
55. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ZONING REs., art. VII, ch. 8 (1973).
56. Elliott & Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo, 1 HoFsTRA L. Rtv. 56, 85 n.117
(1973).
57. 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 931 (1973).
58. Id. at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 603, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 621 (Breitel, J., concurring).
59. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ZONING RES. § 12-10 (1973): "For the purposes of this
definition, ownership of a zoning lot shall be deemed to include a lease of not less
than 50 years duration with an option to renew such lease so as to provide a total
lease of not less than 75 years duration." The definition of zoning lot allows transfer-
ability where such parcels enjoy a common ownership interest for at least 75 years.
A showing of common ownership by the applicant for a building permit will allow
incorporation of any unused development right on the combined zoning lot in a building
plan.
60. See also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
61. Newport Associates v. Solow, 36 App. Div. 2d 519, 317 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1st
Dep't 1971), rev'd, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
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appellate division held for the plaintiff precisely because it saw de-
velopment rights as having value.
Development rights transfer has been used in New York pri-
marily to protect and assist historic landmarks-valuable and endan-
gered urban resources. The concept grew naturally out of the ability
of an owner of two contiguous parcels (which are viewed as one
zoning lot when owned by the same person) to concentrate the bulk
of his building on one parcel. 62 The overall density of the block
remains the same, for the lower density on one parcel compensates
for the greater density on the other. New York City's Landmarks'
Preservation Law63 permitted the city to designate landmarks and
slow down their destruction. Restriction on use that amounted to a
taking, however, was seen as requiring compensation. Acquisition by
the city of landmark properties is usually not practical, particularly
in Manhattan where land values are extremely high. Therefore, city
officials sought to find a way to preserve landmarks through zoning
rather than through the expensive exercise of eminent domain.
Their solution was to broaden the concept of bulk concentration
on one portion of a large single lot6 4 to permit the transfer of unused
development rights from a low density landmark across adjacent lot
lines and to lots across the street.65 In 1969, the concept was further
expanded to permit transfer to lots within a chain of common owner-
ship extending to the landmark lot.66 The city first approved this
type of development rights transfer at the behest of the owner of
Amster Yard, a 19th century collection of small residential structures,
open spaces and stores in midtown Manhattan. 67 The owner of this
landmark was permitted to sell a portion of his development rights
to a nearby parcel on which an office building was to be built.6" In
return, the city required from the developer a promise to create a
$100,000 trust fund, its income to be used for maintenance
62. Naw YoRE Crry, N.Y., ZONING RES. § 12-10 (1973) ("Zoning Lot" defined).
63. Naw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A (1971). The ordinance was en-
acted pursuant to a state enabling act. Ch. 216, § 1, [1956] Laws of N.Y. 908, as
amended, N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAW § 96-a (McKinney Supp. 1973).
64. See Elliott & Marcus, supra note 56.
65. NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ZONING RES. § 74-79.
66. Id.
67. Amster Yard is located on a through-block property, east of Third Avenue,
between 49th and 50th Streets.
68. COMMISSION REPORT (No. OP-21236, July 20, 1970).
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of the landmark. 9 The simplest and most successful development
rights transfers are those employed to preserve a single landmark
building, transferring its unexhausted development rights to an ad-
jacent development site. This was most recently accomplished on the
east side of Manhattan where a small landmark house was preserved
and enhanced through design controls imposed on the adjacent site
and by the transfer of the unused bulk.7 0
Another current effort at development rights transfer in New
York is much more ambitious. The existence of many small buildings
surrounding the Fulton Fish Market in lower Manhattan was an at-
tractive, but uneconomic, use of land. These blocks of small, 200-
year-old buildings were ripe for redevelopment. In order to preserve
this historic area while allowing new development to occur, the city
created the special South Street Seaport District71 which contains a
preservation area and a redevelopment area. The low-scale Seaport
area will be retained by ultimately transferring its unused develop-
ment rights to specified neighboring locations for commercial devel-
opment. The transfer mechanism permits the development rights to
be bought by a middleman and banked. This phase has already oc-
curred. Next, the banked development rights will be shifted onto
designated receiving parcels within the district. This system will aid
the marketability of the development rights. As soon as the develop-
ment rights are physically incorporated in new development, the
profits from the sale can begin to be used for renovation of the his-
toric buildings. The result is that buildings will be maintained and
new development fostered with no net increase in density to the
neighborhood. Potential speculation in these development rights is
curbed by the predesignation of specific receiving lots.
The new zoning district for private parks in New York City is
the latest attempt to use development rights transfers to achieve
health, safety and general welfare objectives. It is the most recent
application of the horizontal division of land concept-an idea that
is at least 100 years old in America. It clearly reflects the fact that
property values in urban cores can no longer be solely attributable
69. NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ZONING RES. § 74-79 (1973) requires "a program for
the continuing maintenance of the landmark." In this instance, the trust fund satisfied
the requirement.
70. CoamssIoN REPORT (Nos. OP-22150, -22151, Nov. 29, 1972).
71. Naw YoRx CITY, N.Y., ZONING REs. § 89-00 et seq (1973).
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to a two-dimensional surface area, but must be largely credited to the
three-dimensional zoning envelope of development rights assigned
pursuant to the police power. Furthermore, property transfers within
New York City indicate that a measurable, even predictable, value
can be assigned to that envelope of rights.
III. WAXING AND WANING OF THE "TAKING" CLAUSE AND ITS
RELATION To THE STATE POLICE POWER To
REGULATE PROPERTY
In Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 72 the
plaintiff argued that the zoning restrictions imposed on the private
open spaces in the Tudor City development constitute a taking of
those properties. A "taking" is a violation of the fifth amendment
to the Constitution: "nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. '78 In
order to assess this claim of taking, it is necessary to review the origins
of the taking clause and the police power in the English common
law, the Constitution and the ensuing cases. It is the argument of
this article that the taking clause, having waxed in the early decades
of this century, is presently waning-contracting in the face of so-
cially imperative police power objectives.
A. Origins of the Taking Clause: A Limitation on the Sovereign's
Personal Power as Distinguished from his Police Power
The English-colonial heritage forms the background for the fifth
amendment requirements of "just compensation" and "due process."
Commentators have been able to find little specific information to
support theories of the meaning of "taking" under the amendment.
Indeed, a recent book, The Taking Issue,74 pointed out: "There is a
conspicuous absence of historical data that might enable one to de-
termine why Madison added the just compensation language to the
72. 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
73. The fourteenth amendment applied this provision to the states.
74. TAxING ISSUE, supra note 7.
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fifth amendment." 75 Madison's language rests firmly on that of the
Magna Carta:
No freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived of
his freehold, or in any way molested; and we will not set forth
against him, nor send against him, unless by the lawful judgement of
his peers and by the law of the land.7 6
There is no mention of compensation in the document.
The property provisions of the Magna Carta were designed to
remedy a specific evil-the arbitrary confiscation of property by the
king for his own use. The document was forced on an unwilling king
and was frequently ignored in the almost 600 years between the sign-
ing of the Magna Carta and the drafting of the Bill of Rights.77 The
deprivation forbidden in the Magna Carta probably meant the actual
confiscation of land. Land use regulation existed in medieval Eng-
land; even regulation that deprived a man of all use of his land was
valid.7 8 Holdsworth wrote on medieval regulation of property in
England:
Property, said the Doctor and Student, was given by the law of man,
not by the law of God or reason; and therefore "the same law may
assigne such conditions upon the propertie as it listeth, so they be
not against the law of God nor the law of reason." Therefore the
state could determine the limitations under which property could be
acquired. In other words it could regulate the conditions under
which all branches of commerce and industry could be carried on.7 9
By the time of the settlement of the United States, this basic concept
had changed little. A man was assured of the security of his property
against seizure by the king-a principle that became of supreme im-
portance in colonial property law-but he was not free from regula-
tion. Coke stated that a property owner could be deprived of all
economic use of his property if the regulation "extends to the public
benefit . . . for this is for the public and everyone hath benefit by
75. Id. at 99-100.
76. Id. at 56.
77. Id. at 57-60.
78. In this connection, note the severe London land use restrictions advanced
in Elizabethan England, including acreage zoning and the prohibition of conversion
of existing structures to multiple dwellings. Id. at 64-67.
79. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 316 (3d ed. 1945).
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it."80 It is also useful to remember that much of the Bill 6f Rights,
like the Magna Carta, is devoted to defining the limitations on the
power of the head of state. Property could not be taken for the pri-
vate use of the sovereign, but it could be taken for public use-the
use of the majority-with the appropriate democratic safeguards.,'
Colonial land use regulations were common, ranging from restric-
tions against overplanting to requirements for planting shade trees.82
When improved private lands were "taken" for a public project such
as the building of a road, compensation was usually required. Fre-
quently, however, compensation was not necessary for the taking of
undeveloped land.83 The United States Supreme Court had few
chances to consider the taking issue in the first half of the 19th cen-
tury. The courts of New York, however, were forced to examine the
problem in depth in the case of Brick Presbyterian Church v.
City of New York. 4 There, the Presbyterian Church had been
granted title to lands on the outskirts of the city for a church and
cemetery. As the city grew, the cemetery became an inappropriate
land use and a potential health hazard, according to the sanitation
theories of the day, and an ordinance was passed forbidding use of
the property for burials. The ruling left the church with almost no
other use for its property and deprived the parish of a place to bury
its dead. Yet the court found for the city, saying:
It would be unreasonable in the extreme, to hold the plaintiffs
should be at liberty to endanger not only the lives of such as belong
to the corporation of the church, but also those of the citizens gen-
erally, because their lease contains a covenant of quiet enjpyment. 85
One year later, in a case upholding the right of the city's harbor
master to control the docking of ships at private wharfs in New York
City's rivers, the court said:
The line between what would be a clear invasion of right on the one
hand, and regulations not lessening the value of the right, and cal-
culated for the benefit of all, must be distinctly marked....
80. The Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 77 Eng. Rep. 1295 (K.B.
1606).
81. TAKING ISSUE 76.
82. See ch. 56, 1 Pa. Laws 18 (1970) (height and thickness of fences); ch. 242,
1 Pa. Laws 150 (1721) (party walls and buildings in Philadelphia).
83. TAKING ISSUE 85.
84. 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1826).
85. Id. at 542.
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... Every public regulation in a city may, and does, in some sense,
limit and restrict the absolute right that existed previously. But this
is not considered as an injury.8 6
It is interesting to note that these cases, and others of the era8 7
rely heavily on the concept of a regulation conferring a benefit to
the public. This requirement goes back to the common law concept
discussed above, that property may be strictly regulated for the public
good but not confiscated by the sovereign. In an 1827 case chal-
lenging a statute which permitted the City of New York to regulate
the interment of the dead within its boundaries, the court expressed
this dichotomy:
[P]rivate property shall not be taken even for public use, without
just compensation. No property has, in this instance, been entered
upon or taken. None are benefited by the destruction, or rather the
suspension of the rights in question, in any other way than citizens
always are, when one of their numbers is forbidden to continue a
nuisance.88
B. Waxing of the Taking Clause
The Supreme Court began its expansion of the taking clause in
the latter part of the 19th century, enlarging sections of the Bill of
Rights to cover actions by the states. The Court's first notable case
on the taking issue was Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,s 9 in which the
Court ruled that permanent flooding of the plaintiff's land by a
state-authorized dam constituted a taking that required compensation.
Later cases, however, interpreted Pumpelly as still requiring an actual
invasion of the land to constitute a taking. As late as 1887 in Mugler
v. Kansas,90 the Court supported the police power even when its pro-
hibitions curtailed substantial investments in property. In the Court's
decision which upheld the Kansas statute prohibiting the manufac-
ture and sale of liquor and made the plaintiff's brewery worthless,
Justice Harlan wrote:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that
are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health,
86. Vanderbuilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349, 351-52 (N.Y. 1827).
87. Coates v. Mayor of the City of New York, 7 Cow. 585 (N.Y. 1827) (group
of cases decided with Vanderbuilt).
88. Stuyvesant v. Mayor of the City of New York, 7 Cow. 588, 606 (N.Y. 1827).
89. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
90. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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morals or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public bene-
fit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use
of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose
of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any one,
for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests.
• . . The exercise of the police power by the destruction of property
which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a
particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very dif-
ferent from taking property for public use, or from depriving a per-
son of his property without due process of law. In the one case, a
nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property is taken
away from an innocent owner.91
The Court did not change its stand when the restrictions involved
oleomargarine instead of liquor. In Powell v. Pennsylvania,92 the
Pennsylvania statute banning the sale of oleomargarine was upheld,
despite the fact that it rendered the plaintiffs' factory virtually use-
less.
At the same time these decisions upholding the local exercise
of the police power despite the adverse impact on economic invest-
ment were coming down, a counter-theme was emerging from the
Court. This theme-the immunity of the labor-management contract
from legislative acts of conscience-which sounded in a series of cases
dealing with wage and hour laws and other social legislation,98 was
to threaten the Mugler scope of police power and significantly emas-
culate it. These cases struck down state laws, enacted under the Arti-
cle X residual police power, protecting the health, safety and general
welfare of the people.
It seems somewhat ironic that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
a dissenter on the decisions throwing out local wage and hour regu-
lations, could rewrite the Constitution in his decision on the taking
clause in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,94 the case that forms the prece-
dent for most pre-1970 decisions on taking. The test for differentiat-
ing a taking from an exercise of the police power became one of the
degree of detriment to commercial value, a very uncertain line. It is
91. Id. at 668-69 (emphasis added).
92. 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
93. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
94. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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a decision appropriate to the laissez-faire politics of the 1920's and its
preceding decades, but not a decision geared to the complexities of
urban life today.
The Kohler Act,9 5 which was the Pennsylvania statute invali-
dated by the Pennsylvania Coal decision, appears to be reasonable
"public safety" legislation. Its provisions forbade the mining of coal
where it would cause the subsidence of developed areas; mine sub-
sidence had become a critical problem in the early 20th century in
northeastern Pennsylvania. Mahon's property had been purchased by
his predecessor in title from the coal company. The deed stipulated
that the coal company retained mineral rights, and the property
owner waived any claims of damage against the company. Since the
company owned most of the land in the area, purchasers had little
bargaining power. Mahon brought suit against the Pennsylvania Coal
Company for an injunction prohibiting mining under his home on
the basis of the Kohler Act. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
finding for Mahon, held the Kohler Act constitutional and declared
the acceptance of mining in the original deed contrary to public
policy.96
Justice Holmes, despite his ringing dissents in defense of wage-
and-hour laws and other social legislation of the era, wrote the
opinion of the Court overturning the Pennsylvania ruling and estab-
lishing a "degree of diminution of value" test to determine "takings"
forbidden by the fifth or the fourteenth amendments. For unstated
reasons, he found interference with property rights to be constitu-
tionally inhibited, even in this mining case with compelling health,
safety and general welfare objectives. Yet Holmes had previously
found, and would subsequently find, no difficulty in upholding similar
interference with private contractual rights.0 7 The philosophy of
Pennsylvania Coal-a kind of social Darwinism which favors untram-
melled use of private resources at the cost of leaving unrequited pub-
lic health, safety and general welfare objectives-seems indistinguish-
able from the other judicial products of the period.
95. Act of May 27, 1921, § 6, [1921] Pa. Laws 1198.
96. Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 274 Pa. 489, 118 A. 491 (1922).
97. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Perhaps
the fact that Pennsylvania coal was an essential national resource in 1922 provides the
key to Holmes' opaque opinion.
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C. Waning of the Taking Clause
Pennsylvania Coal, perhaps because of its curious authorship, has
had a long run through this century. Only in the 1970's have observers
begun to note a lessening of reliance upon it, which appears to be re-
lated to a deepening concern for protection of the natural en-
vironment.98 Whether the nation's highest court expressly overrules
this case, which appears to. put concern for private property far out
in front of concern for the environment, or simply ignores it sub
silentio, in the opinion of some scholars, its chilling influence is
waning. 9 With Pennsylvania Coal out of the way, the police power,
vis-i-vis the taking clause, resumes its Mugler shape and requires a
physical invasion of property for a finding that a taking has occurred.
The analysis of police power regulation shifts in emphasis from im-
pact on private property to an evaluation of the public purpose
served and the adequacy of the means used to achieve the result.100
When seen in the perspective of history, the Pennsylvania Coal
twist on the taking clause seems aberrant and at odds with an old
common law tradition which sanctioned often harsh interferences
with private property when intended for the public good. Certainly
the spate of federal and state environmental legislation,101 enacted
since the late 1960's, would appear to challenge the philosophy, if
not the holding, of Pennsylvania Coal. This legislation, based on a
98. In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973); Potomac Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Governor, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1040 (1972); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.
2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Candlestick Properties Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Con-
servation & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970).
99. See note 122 infra.
100. TAKING Issup-, supra note 7, at ch. 10.
101. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1402 (Supp. II, 1972);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(Supp. II, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1857-58(a) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857(b) et seq. (Supp. I, 1972);
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970); Noise Con-
trol Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (Supp. I, 1972); Environmental Quality
Act of 1970, CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §§ 21000 et seq. (West Supp. 1974); The Oil
Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.011-21 (West
1974); The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, id.
§§ 380.012-.10; Florida Air and Water Pollution Control Act, id. §§ 403.011-.413,
403.60 (West 1973), as amended, (Supp. 1974); Environmental Protection Act, ILL.
STAT. ch. 111/ §§ 1001-51 (Supp. 1974); Land Use Plans and Zoning by Land Con-
servation and Development Commission, 2 ORE. Rav. STAT. §§ 215.505-.535 (1973).
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desire to protect areas of critical concern to the environment and the
public, falls within the tradition of pre-Pennsylvania Coal definitions
of the police power. The majority of cases reviewing these statutes
have generally upheld them in opinions which dwell on the legiti-
macy of the public policy objective.10 2 Effect on private property
owners is not measured against the just compensation requirements
of a taking under Pennsylvania Coal, but rather against a more gen-
eral standard of fairness.103
The authors of The Taking Issue'04 view these cases as forerun-
ners of a resurgence of police power. Although the Special Park Dis-
trict, as applied to the Tudor City Parks, protects a man-made rather
than God-made environmental treasure, this distinction should not
impair the validity of the police power objective. The Tudor City
Parks are as close to the beach as any midtown office worker is likely
to get on his lunch hour.
Not all scholars agree, however, that the police power is being,
or should be, broadened beyond Pennsylvania Coal at the expense of
the taking clause. John J. Costonis writes:
Whether the residual densities prescribed for transfer districts will
trigger a successful taking challenge to transfer programs depends
upon the magnitude of the reduction in economic return that courts
will deem nonconfiscatory and the severity of the particular pro-
gram's restrictions. Neither variable should prove the undoing of a
carefully formulated transfer program.
Recent cases, some assert, support the view that, short of an actual
appropriation by government, regulation of private land use for a
public purpose can never constitute a taking. This interpretation is
perilous for draftsmen of transfer legislation. Aside from its blatant
unfairness as an across-the-board prescription, it may in retrospect
be viewed as an overbroad reading of these cases, which represent
the position of little more than a handful of state courts.
Reliance upon it is unnecessary in any event because established
zoning doctrine provides more than enough leeway to legitimate the
density limitations that are likely to be required to guarantee a trans-
fer program's economic feasibility. The Euclid decision buried the
claim that zoning measures are constitutionally infirm simply because
102. See cases cited at note 98 supra.
103. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) suggests:
"The loss caused the individual must be weighed to determine if it is more than he
should bear." In this measurement, the court suggests the application of "contemporary
standards." Id. at 15, 16, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
104. TAKING IssuF, supra note 7.
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they preclude landowners from devoting their property to its most
profitable use. Instead, these measures are routinely sustained so long
as they advance the community's general welfare and the property
is susceptible to some reasonable, albeit less profitable type or in-
tensity of development. 0 5
Even under this stricter test, the Special Park District cannot
be seen to constitute a taking in the equitable sense. When transfer
of development rights opportunities leave intact the property's po-
tential for generating profit, a restriction to passive recreation on the
surface of the property cannot amount to a taking. This proposition
of law is based in ancient and venerable authority, Lord Coke's
opinion in The King v. Inhabitants of All Saints: "[Flor what is the
land but the profits thereof: for thereby vesture, herbage, trees, mines
and all whatsoever parcel of that land doth passe."'106
When looked at in the context of development rights transfers,
Pennsylvania Coal does not form a barrier to the legislation. The
Holmes decision quotes the earlier case of Commonwealth v. Clear-
view Coal: "For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the
right to mine it."107 Holmes adds in Pennsylvania Coal, "[w]hat makes
the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. '10 8
In urban areas, what makes land valuable is the right to build on it-a
right already regulated by law. If we extend Holmes' reasoning, the
concept of development rights transfer is unimpeachable, since the de-
veloper's right to build is simply shifted to other land, and he retains
his profit. The development rights to be transferred from the Tudor
City Parks are exactly the amount of development rights available
for construction under the preexisting zoning regulation. 00 As stated
above, the transfer from a residential to a commercial district may
even increase the value of the development rights." 0
To the layman, who "thinks of property as a man's belongings,
or as the things that a man owns,"' it may seem strange to speak
of a parcel of land not as a holistic thing, but as the generator of
105. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 107-08 (1973)
(footnotes omitted).
106. The King v. Inhabitants of All Saints, 105 Eng. Rep. 984 (K.B. 1816).
107. 256 Pa. 328, 331 (1917).
108. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
109. NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ZONINO RaS. § 91-03 (1973).
110. See notes 21-22 supra & accompanying text.
111. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv.
691 (1938).
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discrete and separate interests in property including, in this instance,
a right to build in three dimensions elsewhere and a right to main-
tain no more than an open space in a particular location. It is a re-
flection of the legal conception of property not as "things," but as
the sum of the interests that the law recognizes and protects-a
"bundle of rights. -112 The Park District regulation removes from the
bundle of rights, constituting a landowner's property interest, one
single element: the right to build at a particular location. Whether
the mandatory spatial transfer inherent in this regulation can with-
stand the test of the taking clause of the Constitution is the real ques-
tion at issue in the Tudor City litigation. The argument that follows
concludes that the requirement is constitutionally permissible.
Underlying the plaintiff's position in this litigation is a concep-
tion of property as something more than the potential for economic
benefit. That conception is rooted in Blackstone, whose famous defi-
nition of property rights makes no reference to profit or economic
benefit:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and
engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that
sole despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of
any other individual in the universe.' 13
Especially with regard to real property, there is a deep-seated feeling
that it is more than just a thing that can generate profit. Rather,
there exists the feeling that its location, its position in space, is of its
very essence. But, there is a concurrent idea that leads to greater
understanding: "The concept of property never has been, is not, and
never can be of definite content."" 4 The one word "property" has
different meanings for different legal purposes. Arriving at a defini-
tion may prove a fascinating exercise in jurisprudence." 5 However,
the narrower issue involved here, is: what is property for the purpose
of answering the question of whether a police power regulation ef-
fects a taking; and, if it does, what is the nature of the compensation
required?
112. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 5 (1936).
113. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
114. Philbrick, supra note 111, at 696.
115. See Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. R:Ev. 357 (1954).
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It is clear that "property," when considered in connection with
the "taking" question, is not congruent with property in its most ex-
pansive jurisprudential definition. If it were congruent, every govern-
mental interference with property rights would constitute a taking
under the fifth amendment. No constitutional principle is more cer-
tain, however, than the principle that not every governmental in-
terference with private property is a compensable taking. As Justice
Holmes said, "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values
are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power." 1 6 Holmes reinforces the notion that property value can be
damaged without requiring compensation. What then, is the standard
of compensation when property value is diminished beyond the Penn-
sylvania Coal line? Must compensation be made up to the full value
of the property, or only to that level which the value of the property
could legitimately have been reduced under police power? The Con-
stitution uses the phrase "just compensation"; Costonis states that
the property owner should be "duly compensated"; 117 and a third
test of "fair compensation" can be inferred from the environmental
cases of the 1970's.118 Given the legitimacy of a zoning objective to
retain open spaces in densely developed urban areas, a standard which
achieves such objectives without sacrificing the property's economic
value must be upheld. Surely, transferable development rights, sus-
ceptible of market valuation, are a fair compensation for a developer
whose rights could be substantially diminished under more tradi-
tional zoning regulation with no compensation whatsoever."9
The requirement of just compensation would continue to apply
to condemnation and physical invasion takings. A less exacting re-
quirement of "fairness" would seem appropriate where legitimate
police power restrictions on private properly are at issue. The oppor-
116. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
117. Costonis, supra note 105, at 96.
118. See Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). Note
the absence of judicial concern with the compensation issue in Gisler v. County of
Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974) (upholding 18-acre agricul-
tural zone), and in Mayor & Alderman of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md.
265, 316 A.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1974) (just compensation claim rejected in the case of
prohibition of exterior alteration on designated church landmark).
119. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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tunity to use development rights elsewhere, instead of on the desig-
nated area of critical concern to the environment, should be accepted
by the courts as a fair compromise between the public and private
interest.
IV. MANDATORY DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER AWAY FROM AREAs
OF CRITICAL CONCERN TO THE ENVIRONMENT Is NOT A TAKING
OF PROPERTY
The transfer of development rights plan for the Tudor City
Parks does not amount to an uncompensated taking. Under either
the old Pennsylvania Coal test or the newer theory of the 1970's en-
vironmental cases, 120 substantial economic value continues to repose
in the property. Obviously, the simplest and most profitable course
for the developer would be "as-of-right" development, but the city has
found that this course does not promote the general welfare. By
mandating that the developer transfer his building rights to other
property, the city has not taken his interest in the property; it has
regulated his right to build. The transferable development rights
need not be measured against just compensation requirements for a
"taking." They should be seen as a reasonable development alterna-
tive under the regulation of the city's police power, since the de-
veloper is left with many valuable development options within Man-
hattan's most important commercial center.
In a densely urbanized area like Manhattan, the surface of land,
in and of itself, has little intrinsic value. The value of this land lies
in the profit-making structure that can be built on it. This interest
120. See generally TAKING ISSUE.
Although less dramatic than a return to strict construction, a strategy of
gradual evolution is consistent with current trends. In the evolution of a
constitution, it is far more common to find a case gliding gracefully into
oblivion than to find it dramatically overruled. Such could be the fate of
Pennsylvania Coal as an evolving appreciation of public purpose and public
necessity takes form in the 1970's. Courts may increasingly find particular
regulations for the protection of certain environmental and ecological values
such an important exercise of the police power that they outweigh any loss
of land values under the Pennsylvania Coal balancing test.
Id. at 256.
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is severable from the land,121 and a fair redistribution of this interest
does not constitute a taking.
The idea that a regulation of the use of land which prevents the
owner from making money can amount to a taking assumes that a
landowner has a constitutional right to use and develop his land for
some purpose which will result in personal profit, regardless of the
effect that such development will have on the public. Such a hold-
ing gives land as a commodity a constitutional status higher than
other commodities-a status land no longer deserves.'22
Under the Park District regulation, the developer retains the devel-
opment rights in which the full value of his land is reposed and,
therefore, suffers no actual loss in his property's capacity for beneficial
use.' 23 Professor Sax makes the most direct and succinct statement of
this principle: "[W]hatever theory [of what constitutes a compensable
taking] one follows, it is hard to find a taking if the victim suffered
no loss .... ",124
In view of these authorities, any argument which claims that
the Park District regulation is unconstitutional because the city
seeks to enhance its resource position through an exercise of the
police power is clearly in error. 12 There is nothing wrong per se in
the government seeking to enhance its resource position. On the con-
trary, a finding of such result would tend to uphold the regulation
as a proper exercise of the police power, advancing the general wel-
fare. Without elaborating any subtle theories or sophisticated tests,
Justice Holmes stated: "It [the Constitution] deals with persons, not
tracts of land. And the question is what has the owner lost, not what
121. Newport Associates v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d
617 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
122. TAKING IssuE 240 (emphasis added). See also Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972):
The Justs argued their property has been severely depreciated in value. But
this depreciation of value is not based on the use of the land in its natural
state but on what the land would be worth if it could be filled and used for
the location of a dwelling. While loss of value is to be considered in determin-
ing whether a restriction is a constructive taking, value based upon changing
the character of the land at the expense of harm to public rights is not an
essential factor or controlling.
Id. at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 771 (emphasis added).
123. Headly v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936); Forster
v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893).
124. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 42 n.41 (1964).
125. Ayers v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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has the taker gained."' 26 Sax unequivocally applies the concept as the
test of a taking:
The precise rule to be applied is this: when an individual or limited
group in society sustains a detriment to legally acquired existing
economic values as a consequence of government activity which en-
hances the economic value of some governmental enterprise, then
the act is a taking, and compensation is constitutionally re-
quired .... 127
The private interest of the developer in maximum profit ought
to yield to the public good. The developer of the Tudor City Parks
would lose nothing by the transfer of his development rights and the
city would painlessly absorb his building bulk in other nearby struc-
tures. There would be no net gain in density of the area. A few
buildings would rise a few stories higher; but the public would retain
some necessities of urban life: a few trees, benches, sunlight and air.
CONCLUSION: WHERE Do WE Go FROM TUDOR CITY?
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' 28 Justice Sutherland
recognized an evolving use of zoning as a legitimate mode for protect-
ing the ever-changing general welfare:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with
the great increase and concentration of population, problems have
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will
continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and
occupation of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the
wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing condi-
tions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a cen-
tury ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been
rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.... [W]hile the meaning of con-
stitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of their application must
expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which
are constantly coming within the field of their operation.129
Broadly speaking, zoning regulations involve use, bulk and density
restrictions on private property. Bulk restrictions have increasingly
126. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
127. Sax, supra note 124, at 67.
128. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
129. Id. at 386-87.
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taken the form of floor-area restrictions which limit building size to
that which can be supported by the municipality.
Zoning ordinances have traditionally regulated development by
employing the zoning lot as the unit of control, but any unit with
commonly accepted boundaries could be used easily. Some of the
more flexible approaches to development control have included
"large scale developments, ' 130 and "planned unit [or cluster] develop-
ments."'131 These alternatives maintain the same overall density of
single lot subdivisions but permit more design flexibility, often to
preserve the character of the land-unique topography, ponds and
trees. If a larger area unit of control is acceptable for developments
in single ownership, it should be equally acceptable where owner-
ship in the larger area is fragmented. It could serve the same plan-
ning goal-better development with greater zoning flexibility without
increasing density. Perhaps most important, the resulting zoning flexi-
bility could provide the framework necessary to sustain stringent pub-
lic regulation of areas of critical concern to the environment, such
as major public resource areas.
State police power is more and more frequently being employed
to protect areas of the environment. The term environment, in this
context, must include such things as landmark structures, topography,
coastal areas and improved open space in densely developed com-
munities. We may, in such areas, be witnessing a significant erosion
in the traditional protection accorded private property rights in favor
of public rights.
The individual zoning lot unit of development control has op-
erated at cross purposes with these public objectives by maximizing
development pressure in high value land areas on all underdeveloped
lots. The classic zoning ordinance set up uniform controls for all lots
at a time when environmental areas of critical concern were but
dimly perceived. Growth, at that time, was the social imperative; and
the major constraint in zoning was to promote equal opportunity by
treating large areas according to uniform regulations. The potentially
large zoning development envelope for underdeveloped lots became
an irresistible attraction. Alternatives to this attraction had to be
found if precious landmarks and other socially prized urban spaces
130. NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ZONING RES. § 78-00 et seq (1973).
131. Id.
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were to survive. After the loss of many amenities, the planning ra-
tionale and zoning technology for large-scale developments focused
on the problem. The notion of development rights transfer to serve
defined planning purposes is the result.
It would be simplistic to assume that such transfers could always
occur without adverse planning consequences. Although the preserva-
tion benefit is always immediately ascertainable, the burdens, in the
form of excess bulk and density on the receiving lot, may be insup-
portable to the immediate neighbors of the receiving lot. Generally,
the further the development rights are transferred, the less percep-
tible are the benefits in the eyes of the neighbors of the receiving
lot. Such "cross-town transfers" may be regarded as spot zoning devia-
tions from a plan.132 Given the potential for abuse of the long dis-
tance transfer technique, its exercise should only be allowed by spe-
cial permit of the municipality after making strict planning-oriented
findings. 33
The notion of a development rights transfer as a means by which
the public protects an area of critical concern to it, while at the same
time treating a property owner fairly, may see considerable use over
the next decade.' 34 With the passage of environmental legislation at
the federal and state level,135 recognizing the necessity for protecting
public access to, and enjoyment of, unique private areas threatened
by development, courts have already begun to reflect on the im-
portance of this emerging set of social values. The value of areas of
132. Comment, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J.
338 (1972).
133. For the special permit provisions for Special Park District, see notes 14-19
supra & accompanying text.
134. See Costonis, supra note 105.
135. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (1970); National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970); California Coastal
Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 27000 et seq. (West Supp.
1974); Coastal Zone Act, 7 DEL. CODE ANN. §§ 7001-13 (Noncum. Supp. 1972);
The Big Cypress Conservation Act of 1973, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.055 et seq. (1973);
Coastal Wetlands and Zoning Law, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-58 (1974);
Shorelands Protection and Management Act of 1970, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 281.63 et seq. (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9A-1 et seq. (1970); Tidal Wet-
lands Act, N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION LAW §§ 25-0101 et seq. (McKinney
1973); Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. Exc. LAW §§ 800-19 (McKinney 1971);
Coastal Resource Management Council, R.I. GEN. LAw ANN. §§ 46-23-1 et seq.
(1970); Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 90.50010
et seq. (1973); Shoreland Zoning Ordinance No. 24, Marinette County, Wis. (1967).
For a discussion of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, an interstate compact ap-
proved by Congress, California and Nevada, see TAKING ISSUE 40.
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critical concern to the public such as coastal shorelines, landmark
buildings and rare open spaces in densely developed areas can be ex-
pected to gain judicial protection against legal challenges, premised
on the taking of private property absent the "just compensation"
form of compensation. The courts have already begun by refusing to
give private owners the option of electing condemnation compensa-
tion when municipalities are incapable of offering it.180 Mandatory
development rights transfer offers a middle ground, assuring the pub-
lic objective while not bankrupting the municipal treasury and still
affording the private property owner a fair measure of value for his
property.
136. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d
762 (Sup. Ct. 1973). While invalidating the Special Parks District zoning provision, the
court refused to find a "taking."
